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CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii); what instruments qualify for expeditious treat-
ment under CPLR 3213; and, when is the last day on which an applica-
tion to stay arbitration may be received by a party demanding arbitra-
tion?
Additionally, a number of recent decisions have created uncer-
tainty in areas which appeared to be settled. Particularly important
are the cases dealing with the relation back doctrine of CPLR 203(e),
the definition of timely commencement under CPLR 205(a), and the
personal delivery requirement of CPLR 308(1).
Lastly, special mention should be made of Murphy v. St. Charles
Hospital and In re Einstoss which are discussed under CPLR sections
214(6) and 320 respectively. In Murphy the Second Department moved
one step closer to a rule of discovery in medical malpractice cases. In
Einstoss the Court of Appeals broadened the concept of a limited ap-
pearance and opened the door for a reevaluation of the liability of a
nonresident defendant vis-;k-vis his codefendants and the original plain-
tiff.
The Survey sets forth in each installment those cases which are
deemed to make the most significant contribution to New York's pro-
cedural law. Due to limitations of space, however, many other less
important, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. While
few cases are exhaustively discussed, it is hoped that the Survey ac-
complishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant
developments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in the
cases are listed under their respective titles.
ARnCLE 2 -LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 203(e): Wrongful death claim deemed not to relate back to
cause of action for personal injuries.
To overcome the harsh effects of Harriss v. Tams,1 the Advisory
Committee2 recommended passage of CPLR 203(e). This section pro-
vides that a claim asserted in an amended pleading relates back, for
1258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932) (statute of limitations is tolled only as to those
claims originally inserted).
2 See SECOND REP. 50-51. In drafting the CPLR, the Advisory Committee intended to
afford the courts the "widest possible discretion" when ruling on motions to amend or
supplement pleadings. FntwR REP. 78. In fact, both CPLR 203(e) and CPLR 3025(b) were
designed to permit even greater freedom than the federal rule, FED. R. Crv. P. 15(a), (c),
after which they were patterned. See I WK&M 203.30.
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statute of limitations purposes, to the time when the original claim
was interposed, "unless the original pleading does not give notice of
the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences,
to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading." Recently, in Rober-
son v. First National City Bank,3 the court was confronted with a prob-
lem that has puzzled academicians almost since the enactment of the
CPLR: does the language of CPLR 203(e) encompass claims which are
interposed in supplemental rather than amended pleadings?4
In Roberson plaintiff sought leave to amend her complaint in a
personal injury action to add a cause of action for wrongful death.
Since the statute of limitations had already expired on the latter claim,
it would be time-barred unless it were deemed to fall within the ame-
liorative prescription of CPLR 203(e). Fully cognizant of liberal hold-
ings such as Berlin v. Goldberg,5 the court nonetheless held that the
claim was barred; although the original complaint gave notice of the
accident which allegedly caused the death, it did not give "notice of
the causal connection to effectuate the subsequent death which is an
essential element of the occurrence constituting the death 'to be proved
pursuant to the amended pleading.' "6
Apparently, the Roberson court was troubled by the fact that the
death was not caused directly by injuries sustained in the accident, but
by an aggravation of a preexisting ulcer condition. Nevertheless, similar
facts were presented in Berlin, where the death was allegedly caused
by the aggravation of a preexisting heart condition. Thus, in neither
case did the original complaint give notice of the causal connection to
effectuate the subsequent death. A distinction between the cases, how-
ever, which might afford grounds for reconciliation in the future, is
that in Berlin the defendant was apprised of the wrongful death claim
shortly after service of the original complaint when plaintiff sought
unsuccessfully to transfer the action to the supreme court;7 in Roberson
it appears that the defendant received no notice of the wrongful death
claim until six years after the death. Indeed, the court concluded by
noting that the motion before it was accompanied by gross laches.
3 63 Misc. 2d 105, 311 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
4 An amended pleading is one that adds allegations which could have been included
in the original pleadings; a supplemental pleading is one that adds allegations of events
which occurred after the service of the original pleading or of which the pleader was ig-
norant at the time of service. For a discussion of the theoretical difficulty created by CPLR
3025(b) vis-h-vis CPLR 203(e), see 7B MCK1NNY's CPLR 203, supp. commentary at 31-32
(1966).
5 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); see also Rin-
gle v. Bass, 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1965).
6 63 Misc. 2d at 106, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
7 Berlin v. Goldberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 770, 253 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1st Dep't 1964).
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Implicit in the Roberson holding is the proposition that had the
subsequent death been caused by injuries sustained in the accident, a
prompt motion to amend would have been granted. Apparently, the
distinction between amended and supplemental pleadings has become
blurred to the point that in and of itself it is not a ground for deny-
ing a motion to amend." Instead, the court's power to deny the motion
on the basis of prejudice to the opposing party should become the focal
point of inquiry. Where, as in Roberson, the lapse of time reeks of
injustice, the motion to amend is properly denied.
CPLR 203(e): Notice requirement of section is not satisfied when
movant seeks to change the status in which party is sued.
Under CPLR 203(e), may a claim asserted in an amended plead-
ing against a party as defendant be deemed to relate back to notice
contained in the original complaint which was received by the party in
his status as plaintiff? The Supreme Court, Nassau County, answered
this question negatively in Ward v. MarinoY
In Ward an action was commenced on behalf of Linda Ward to
recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident and
on behalf of the estate of Thomas Ward, a passenger in a car driven by
Linda Ward, to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful
death. Subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision in Gelbman v.
Gelbman,10 the executrix of Thomas Ward's estate sought leave to
serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint asserting a
claim for personal injuries and wrongful death against Linda Ward.
In response, the statute of limitations defense was raised.
The court was confronted with two alternatives in deciding
whether the claim was embodied by CPLR 203(e). On the one hand,
it could compare the instant situation to the case wherein the plaintiff
does not seek to add new parties, but merely to change the capacity in
which the defendant is sued, e.g., from trustee capacity to individual
capacity. On the other hand, the court could compare the proposed
amendment to the instance where a plaintiff is asserting a claim against
a third-party defendant. In the former situation, the statute of limita-
tions is not a bar;" in the latter case, the claim is time-barred 12 (even
8 See Werner Spitz Constr. Co. v. Vanderlinde Elec. Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 157, 314
N.Y.S.2d 567 (Monroe County Ct. 1970) (term "amended" under 203(e) embraces supple-
mental as well as amended pleadings).
9 64 Misc. 2d 44, 313 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
10 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969) (doctrine of intrafamily im-
munity abolished); see also 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 127 (1969).
11 Boyd v. United States Mort. & Trust Co., 187 N.Y. 262, 79 N.E. 999 (1907).
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